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Details

  • 2 maps 13 tables
  • Page extent: 272 pages
  • Size: 228 x 152 mm
  • Weight: 0.49 kg
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Paperback

 (ISBN-13: 9780521747295)

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$31.99 (Z)

Of all the different types of civil war, disputes over self-determination are the most likely to escalate into war and resist compromise settlement. Reputation and Civil War argues that this low rate of negotiation is the result of reputation building, in which governments refuse to negotiate with early challengers in order to discourage others from making more costly demands in the future. Jakarta’s wars against East Timor and Aceh, for example, were not designed to maintain sovereignty but to signal to Indonesia’s other minorities that secession would be costly. Employing data from three different sources - laboratory experiments on undergraduates, statistical analysis of data on self-determination movements, and qualitative analyses of recent history in Indonesia and the Philippines - Barbara F. Walter provides some of the first systematic evidence that reputation strongly influences behavior, particularly between governments and ethnic minorities fighting over territory.

Contents

Part I. Theory: 1. Introduction; 2. Reputation building and self-determination movements; Part II. Empirical Tests: 3. An experimental study of reputation building and deterrence with Dustin Tingley; 4. Government responses to self-determination challenges; 5. Ethnic groups and the decisions to seek self-determination; Part III. Case Studies: 6. Indonesia: many ethnic groups, few demands; 7. The Philippines: few ethnic groups, many demands; Part IV. Conclusions: 8. Reputation building and deterrence in civil wars; Appendices.

Reviews

“We all know that separatist movements often but not always lead to bitter and prolonged conflict, but until now it has been a mystery as to what explains the variation. Drawing on theory, laboratory experiments, statistical analysis, and case studies, Walter shows that much of the answer lies in whether a state is faced with multiple potential challenges and therefore has to defend its reputation for holding firm. Rarely has such an important puzzle been so well explained.”
Robert Jervis, School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University

“By showing that reputation is important and also shaped by context, Barbara Walter makes an important contribution to debates in international relations as well as to the study of civil war.”
Robert O. Keohane, Professor of International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of International and Public Affairs, Princeton University

“Barbara Walter strikes again! Her first book altered our thinking and our policies about civil war termination, showing that separating armies in civil wars incurs commitment problems that make these wars more difficult to end than interstate wars. This book, her second major work on civil wars, is equally stunning. Relying on theory, case studies, statistical and experimental analysis, it shows how reputation problems lead highly fragmented states to be more bellicose in the face of separatist rebellion than less fragmented states. Once again, Walter’s work will impress academics and reframe public policy.”
David D. Laitin, James T. Watkins IV and Elise V. Watkins Professor of Political Science, Stanford University

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